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Abstract 
 
Non-profit organisations (NPOs) are major providers of services in many fields of endeavour, 
and often receive financial support from government. This paper investigates different forms 
of government/non-profit funding relationships, with the viewpoint being mainly, though not 
exclusively, from the perspective of the non-profit agencies. While there are a number of 
existing typologies of government/NPO relations, these are dated and in need of further 
empirical analysis and testing. The paper advances an empirically derived extension to 
current models of government/NPO relations. A future research agenda is outlined based on 
the constructs which underpin typologies, rather than discrete categorisation of relationships.  
 
Keywords 
government, nonprofit, relationships, typology,    
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MODELLING NPO-GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS: AUSTRALIAN CASE 
STUDIES 
Introduction 
 
Non-profit organisations [NPOs] are major providers of services in many fields such as 
health, education, the arts, sport, the environment and community development in Australia 
(Lyons 1993, 1998, 2001b; Lyons and Passey 2006).  They are important niche providers in 
housing, employment and training and legal services and are significant actors in the 
representation of interests, including those of disadvantaged groups such as Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples and ethnic communities.  
 
In many of these fields, non-profit groups receive financial support from government. This 
support often takes the form of the purchase of a service by the government on behalf of a 
user of the service, although many other arrangements are used by governments to provide 
financial support for NPOs (Lyons and Dalton 2011). This purchaser / provider model of 
relationships was made popular under New Public Management logics, with emphasis on 
competitive tendering and contracting out (Osborne 2006). In more recent years this has 
shifted to New Public Governance with a focus on more relational forms of contracting 
(Osborne 2006).  These varying contracting arrangements result in different types of 
relationships between government departments and NPOs (Brown and Ryan 2003). This 
paper investigates some of the different forms of these relationships, mostly from the 
perspective of NPOs. While there have been a number of attempts to develop typologies of 
NPO / government relationships (e.g. Brown and Ryan 2003; Coston 1998; Najam 1996a), 
these typologies are quite dated now, and are in need of empirical reassessment, particularly 
given the move to more partnership-based relationships (Batley and Rose 2010; Brinkerhoff 
and Brinkerhoff 2011). As will be identified in this paper, the ways that relationships are 
created and shaped by funding are unsurprisingly problematic. Additionally, little empirical 
research has been undertaken to examine the underlying factors or dimensions that might 
affect the funding relationships between government and non-profits (McLaughlin 2011), or 
to empirically test and potentially extend existing models. 
 
In the context of the conflicted service delivery context and estrangement between NPOs and 
governments in Australia, the present discussion sets out to identify factors which lead to an 
improvement in government / non-profit relations by examining successful funding 
programs.  In specific terms, this paper will: 
 Clarify the characteristics of funding programs that non-profit leaders would find 
satisfactory, which tend to align with the ideal type identified by Brinkerhoff (2002); 
 Identify funding programs that are considered to be working well; and  
 Describe some of the variables, both endogenous and exogenous, that determine 
success or failure.  
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The over-arching aim of this paper is to test and extend current models of NPO / government 
relationships, through identifying the factors involved in specific relationships which are 
regarded by both as successful. In such a way, the paper progresses a research agenda set out 
by Lyons (2003) to improve NPO / government relationships, as well as engaging in a 
process of theorising (Weik 1999) about the dimensions by which such relationships might be 
analysed.  
Government relations with NPOs 
An important theme in the literature pertaining to contracting-out of services by government 
to NPOs is the relationships that develop between these parties. Many services delivered by 
OECD governments were contracted-out to NPOs from the 1990s onwards (Catlaw and 
Chapman 2007; Spicer 2004; Kettl 2000; Dunleavy and Hood 1994). While it is possible to 
examine the success of these initiatives from an economic perspective (e.g. O'Toole and 
Meier 2004) there are also relational implications resulting from the shift to contracting out of 
services. While possible to explore the relationship between for-profit firms and government 
(c.f. Marwell and McInerney 2005 for a discussion of this phenomena), or non-profit 
contracting of government (Earles and Baulderstone 2012), these are beyond the scope of this 
paper. The focal point of this paper is exclusively examining the relationship between a 
government which provides some form of funding and a NPO delivering services.  
 
Community service organisations historically have operated in ways that do not conform to 
the assumptions underlying market contracting, instead emphasising collaboration and 
organisational interdependency (Flynn, Pickard, and Williams 1995). In terms of their 
relations with governments, the traditional preference for a NPO was to remain autonomous, 
however, the pressure of service delivery and funding arrangements made autonomy very 
difficult to achieve (Coston 1998). Research into the relationships of NPOs with government, 
under early service delivery contracts, found these relationships variously: to have an 
undercurrent of negativity (Gazley and Brudney 2007); be highly problematic (Menefee 
1997; Young 2000), or simply ‘bad’ (Lyons 2003); with examples of good relationships quite 
rare (Brown and Troutt 2004). The negative perception of competitive tendering and 
contracting led to calls for alternative models of relationships by academics and advocates for 
NPOs (Coston 1998; Slyke 2002; Yeatman 2001).  
 
A case was made by NPOs for more collaborative arrangements following the early 
experiences with contracting out, and this case was generally accepted by governments 
(Batley and Rose 2010), as collaboration between government, private and NPOs are 
essential to solve social problems (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011). Over time, the rhetoric 
of competition associated with early attempts at contracting out was steadily reframed in 
government documents in many different countries, such as the UK, USA, Australia and 
South Asia (Adams and Hess 2001; Feiock and Andrew 2007; Lewis 1999; Ryan 2001; 
Batley and Rose 2010) to include notions of partnership, cooperation and relationships. This 
is reflected in discussions around the shift from New Public Management to New Public 
Governance (Osborne 2006), and the introduction of Compacts in the UK and Canada, which 
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are discussed further below (Casey et al. 2010). Theoretical models reflected this shift in 
relationships with notions of complementarity (Coston 1998; Najam 2000), and cooperation 
(Coston 1998; Najam 2000) appearing in various models of relationships, alongside prevalent 
notions of competition.  
 
However, while more modern documents relating to government-NPO relations are replete 
with the language of partnership and collaboration, the service agreements that govern these 
relationships often display distinct inequities in power (Brown and Ryan 2003). The reason 
for this inequity is often the legal framing of contracts for NPOs delivering services by 
service agreements. These contracts most closely resemble those of for-profit contractors to 
government (McGregor-Lowndes and Turnour 2003). Thus, while collaboration may be seen 
to have been achieved, it may well be in name only (Salamon 1987; Almog-Bar and 
Zychlinski 2012), with the empirical evidence suggesting that there are large degrees of 
variation in the success of these collaborations (Gazley and Brudney 2007). While 
governments continue to subscribe to the view that their role is simply to purchase services 
from NPOs, then it is difficult for the rhetoric of collaboration to become a reality (Brown 
and Ryan 2003).  
 
Despite these difficulties, relationships remain critical to the effective delivery of social 
services by NPOs on behalf of government (Austin 2003, 103). As noted in the introduction,  
empirical testing and extension of the extant typologies has not been extensively undertaken 
to date (McLoughlin 2011); and the search for effective examples of true collaborations, 
while rare (Brown and Troutt 2004), are essential (Austin 2003), and will hopefully provide 
exemplars of ways to improve relationships between government and NPOs in Australia 
(Lyons 2003).  
 
The Third Sector in the Australian context 
In Australia the term ‘third sector’ encompasses the same organisations that are involved in 
the ‘social economy’ in Europe (Lyons and Passey 2006). However, a single specific term for 
the organisations which comprise this sector is problematic. There is a proliferation of names 
for NPOs (Lyons 1998), due to a lack of specific Australian legislation defining non-profits 
or charities (Lyons and Dalton 2011), with different laws passed on a piecemeal basis. This 
means that all ‘charities are non-profit organisations, but not all (or even most) non-profits 
are charities’ (Lyons and Dalton 2011, 242). In the absence of a legally defined term, the 
designation non-profit organisation or NPO will be used to refer to non-profit organisations, 
as this can be readily understood by a wider readership.  
 
Australia’s third sector is comprised of approximately 700,000 organisations (Lyons 2001b), 
although only around 35,000 of these are employers (Lyons and Dalton 2011), and would be 
considered large compared too many other countries (Lyons 1998). Currently, 58,000 of 
these are registered with the Australian Charities and Non-profits Commission (ACNC), the 
new national regulator for the sector (Australian Charities and Non-profits Commission 
2013). Since European settlement, non-profit organisations have been the main providers of 
social services (particularly aged care, child care, and services for people with disabilities), 
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and a significant provider of education, a phenomenon that continues today (Lyons and 
Dalton 2011). Rather than the government providing social services in the early colonial 
years, (with the exception of some schooling), colonists were encouraged to establish non-
profit organisations, to which the government often provided grants or subsidies (Lyons 
1998).  This provision of grants, with very little restriction on the use of these funds, was an 
established practice which still continues in a diminished form (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2009). However, with the implementation of NPM in the 1990s, the majority of 
these grants were redefined as purchasing of services by government on behalf of specific 
people with needs (Lyons and Dalton 2011). This is now the dominant form of funding 
provided by governments to NPOs in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009). This 
shift away from historic ways of funding the sector had several ramifications.  
 
The enthusiastic embracing of NPM by all levels of government (Lyons and Dalton 2011), 
together with: an underfunding of service provision, and an expectation that non-profits 
fundraise to cover the shortfall; greater level of reporting requirements imposed by 
governments on their ‘service providers’; subordinating hitherto independent non-profits to 
government control; and the use of competitive tendering for funding (Brown and Ryan 
2003; Lyons and Passey 2006) – all acted to sour relationships between governments and 
NPOs (Lyons and Dalton 2011). Moreover, governments became sensitive to criticism, and 
clauses were inserted in service contracts which effectively placed restrictions on NPO ability 
to criticize aspects of government policy (McGregor-Lowndes and Turnour 2003). While 
these clauses have now been removed from federal government contracts, this has only 
benefited a very small percentage of NPOs, as most third sector contracts are with other 
levels of government (Lyons and Dalton 2011).   
 
Meanwhile, elsewhere in the world, more collaborative forms of engagement between 
government and NPOs were enthusiastically explored, and have became seen as the norm 
(Brinkerhoff 2002; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002). Compacts, for example, are high level 
agreements aimed at strengthening collaborative relationships between NPOs and 
governments, with the United Kingdom and Canada as examples (see Casey et al. 2010 ). 
Initial proposals to implement a Compact between government and non-profits in Australia, 
based on the UK model, were viewed very pessimistically by Lyons (2001a) and the 
Canadian experience showed that early implementation involved gains and losses for the 
sector (Phillips and Levasseur 2004). However, despite these challenges, years of 
consultation, resulted in the initiation of Compacts at a state level in Australia, and a National 
Compact was eventually established in March 2010, under the then Rudd government.  
 
Inevitably reviews of the implementation of a National Compact have occurred, and as ‘far as 
most governments were concerned, Compacts have been a gesture, no more’ (Lyons and 
Dalton 2011, 253). As Schrapnel, then President of the Australian Council for Social Services 
(a national peak welfare organisation) noted:  
 
The National Compact was designed to herald a new beginning in Government and 
Not for Profit relationships... However, beyond eliminating so called ‘gag’ clauses in 
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government contracts, it is difficult to see two years on a whole lot of tangible 
improvement in the way business is transacted between Government and NFPs ... in 
many ways Government really doesn’t get it when it comes to working with the NFP 
sector (Schrapnel, cited by ProBono Australia 2012).  
 
There are many reasons why Compacts have largely failed in Australia. Essentially the 
specific institutional and intellectual resources necessary to foster the vision of an expanded 
collaborative venture between government the Third Sector were missing (Lyons and Dalton 
2011). These include: the historically bad relationships between government and NPOs in 
Australia; the lack of a single peak organisation to represent the entire Third Sector in 
Australia; the lack of progressive think tanks to push policy development; and a lack of 
champions from both government and charities to invest the time and energy to drive through 
policy change (Lyons 2001a, 1998; Lyons and Passey 2006; Lyons and Dalton 2011). As 
Lyons and Passey (2006, 91) lamented: 
 
No Australian government has publically acknowledged the importance of the third 
sector; no Australian government has sought to develop a coherent policy toward the 
sector. 
 
Thus, while other parts of the world have apparently witnessed a shift from competitive 
tendering under NPM logics, to a more collaborative form of working together under NPG 
(Osborne 2006), this trend has failed to take root to the same extent locally, and Australia has 
essentially lagged behind overseas trends (Lyons and Dalton 2011; Lyons and Passey 2006). 
As Lyons and Dalton (2011) note, NPM is very firmly entrenched and is unlikely to be 
weakened in Australia in the foreseeable future. Consequently, while notions of ‘partnership’ 
are prevalent in other countries, this term is not suitable for an Australian context, and the 
term relationship will be used instead. Such a term is wide in its scope and needs refining for 
use in this paper. The notion of roles perhaps serves this purpose best.   
 
NPOs have primary roles as service deliverer, policy advocate, and community developers 
(Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002). As Marwell (2004) notes these roles tend to build on 
each other, and advocacy activities leverage their community service and community 
development. For their part governments, while often discussed in ‘omnibus’ terms (Candler 
and Dumont 2010), engage with the non-profit sector in multiple roles, such as taxation (tax 
concession) functions, regulatory functions or contracting functions (Kearns 1994). 
Deploying the notion of roles helps us to understand that NPO / government relationships can 
be both cooperative and adversarial at the same time (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002) due 
to the multifaceted nature of both government and non-profit organisations, and the differing 
roles that they play. Thus a non-profit can be ‘courageous in one place and opportunistic in 
another, from being innovative here and conservative there’ (Bode 2006, 355). Any of these 
differing roles are all valid topics of research, however it is important to clarify what role 
each organisation is taking in relation to each other, when discussing NPO / government 
relationships.  
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While such simultaneity (Young 2000) is important to acknowledge, developing a coherent 
model which encompasses all of these different roles is difficult, particularly as not every 
NPO engages in every role (Marwell 2004). Additionally in the Australian context, the 
entrenched NPM thinking of many Australian governments brings with it the expectation that 
NPOs should simply focus on service provision, and lack the understanding that advocacy is 
a normal practice (Lyons and Dalton 2011). For the purposes of this paper, then, the assumed 
roles are where the government acts as contractor for service delivery, and the NPO acts as 
service deliverer on behalf of government, allowing for an array of ways to structure such 
arrangements (Lyons 1995; Najam 2000; Young 2000), and for non-profits also engaging in 
community development and advocacy roles. Najam (1996a) notes that this relationship 
between NPO as service deliverer and government as a funder is one of the most obvious 
relationships.  
 
Given the historically conflicted situation in Australia between governments and NPOs, and 
the way Australia is lagging behind international notions of collaboration (Lyons 2001a; 
Lyons and Dalton 2011) finding examples of successful collaboration and the key enabling 
elements, is an important research agenda (Lyons 2003). In order to progress this research 
agenda, a theoretical framework that differentiates types of relationships is needed. This is 
because a theoretical understanding of government non-profit relationships can be used to 
critique empirical relationships (Salomon 1987; Brinkerhoff 2002).  
 
Four original typologies of government / non-profit relations have been identified as relevant 
to this research: Brown and Ryan (2003), Coston (1998), Lyons (1995) and Najam (2000). 
The models by Coston (1998) and Najam (2000) have been referred to extensively in reviews 
of the literature (e.g. McLoughlin 2011), while the two Australian models (Lyons 1995; and 
Brown and Ryan 2003) have been included as these are the only two typologies which 
acknowledge the uniquely Australian context. Given the atypical nature of some of the 
trajectories of Australian third sector this is seen as appropriate.  
 
In terms of the currency of these models, some have been individually tested empirically. 
For example, Ramanath and Ebrahim (2010) test Najam’s (2000) framework; Almog-Bar 
and Zychlinski (2012) cite Coston’s (1998) amongst others; and Gazely (2008) uses 
elements of both Coston and Najam in a quantitative study. However, to date there has been 
no known attempt to empirically improve on the extant typologies, particularly in a 
comparative sense. Thus the selection of typologies uses contextually specific ones (Lyons 
1995; Brown and Ryan 2003), and internationally developed typologies (Coston 1998; 
Najam 2000). 
 
Moreover, the existing typologies of structured government / non-profit service contracts are 
all a decade or more old. While authors have recently advanced typologies of philanthropic 
relationships (e.g. Frumkin 2006a, 2006b; Person et al. 2009) or non-profit – for-profit 
relationships (Wymer and Samu 2003), a comprehensive reassessment of the valence of the 
typologies of Brown and Ryan (2003), Coston (1998), Lyons (1995) and Najam (2000), for 
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contemporary settings, needs to be undertaken1. This is because their age may mean that 
these typologies no longer reflect the realities facing the sector, and new forms of 
relationship may be found to exist, which have not been noted by previous authors.   
 
Thus, the models of Coston (1998), Brown and Ryan (2003), Lyons (1995) and Najam 
(2000) may be understood as the received wisdom in terms of the current spectrum of 
government / non-profit relationships. However, the explanatory value of these various 
typologies, and the factors that affect these relationships, require systematic testing in an 
empirical setting (McLoughlin 2011). This is the gap in the literature which this paper seeks 
to fill. Figure 1 below compares these typologies. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Typologies of government / non-profit relations 
 
Coston (1998) built on the work of Salamon (1987) in order to develop a typology and model 
of community sector / government relationships. According to this model, relationships 
between government and NPOs can be posited on a continuum ranging from Repression and 
Rivalry at one end, through Competition, Contracting, Third Party Government, Cooperation 
and Complementarity, to Collaboration at the other end. These terms warrant further 
explanation. 
 
                                            
1 Gazely (2008) comes the closest in terms of identifying axes of power and formality in the funding 
relationships, however does not offer up an alternative complete typology of relationships  
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Repression and Rivalry exist where government limits the operations of non-profit groups 
through regulation and onerous reporting by force (Salamon and Anheier 1996). The logic 
behind this policy is that community services should be delivered by the state. According to 
this view, community service agencies are perceived as untenable rivals to the state.  
 
Competition is characterised by either political or economic competition (Coston 1998).  
Competition in service delivery is viewed positively by government; for it is perceived to 
result in increased efficiencies on account of market forces. However, political competition is 
often not viewed positively by government since non-profit groups can provide a basis for 
concerted criticism of government policy (Coston 1998). Conversely, non-profit groups view 
economic competition negatively, and political competition is viewed positively.  This 
distinction between economic competition and political competition is useful. This is because 
the two are often referred to simultaneously (see ACOSS 2001). Unfortunately, political 
competition can ‘prohibit the identification of complementarities that could maximise the 
efficiency and effectiveness of both actors and result in better services for beneficiaries’ 
(Coston 1998, 365). Brown and Ryan (2003) refer to competition as ‘advocacy’ in their 
model.  
 
Contracting is considered a pragmatic option for government since it devolves service 
delivery to other agencies, yet maintains a central role in the process (Kramer 1981). While 
government tends to view contracting positively, the impact on NPOs is often viewed 
negatively (McDonald 2004). If a NPO enters into a contract with government, it can risk 
losing its legitimacy according to its constituents if government uses that funding to exert 
control (Coston 1998). From a government perspective, while services have been contracted 
out, responsibility and risk have not, and governments remain responsible for the service 
delivery by their agents (Administrative Review Council 1998; Barrett 1999). Contracting 
equates to ‘extension of government’ by Brown and Ryan (2003) and ‘competitive tendering’ 
by Lyons (1995).  
 
Third-party government is closely related to contracting.  While government provides the 
majority of financing, non-profit agencies organise and deliver services. Osborne and Gaebler 
(1992) characterise this as the essential difference between ‘steering’ and ‘rowing’.  Steering 
involves setting broad policy objectives, whereas rowing involves focussing on one issue and 
doing it well. The key difference between contracting and third party government is that the 
government shares with non-profit agencies a greater amount of discretion over the spending 
of public funds (Salamon 1987).  While service delivery is transferred to the non-profit 
sector, individuals are able to choose their own service provider, and there is a reduction of 
government influence over the NPO (Coston 1998). Third-party government is seen to create 
a public presence without expanding bureaucracy, provide diversity and competition, and 
increase efficiency (Salamon 1987). Lyons (1995) refers to third party government as 
‘planning’ or ‘voucher funding’ of NPOs and Najam (2000) refers to this as cooptation.  
 
Much of the literature on non-profit / government relations tends to emphasise the conflictive 
nature of the relationship. However, Salamon and Anheier (1996) argue that this competitive 
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view is often false.  NPOs and governments have cooperated with each other in many 
countries (Salamon 1987). This cooperation is characterised by sharing of information, 
resources and joint action between government and non-profit agencies (Najam 2000).  
Cooperation is similar to Lyons’ (1995) ‘submission’ funding model.  
 
Complementarity emphasises mutual advantage, whereby government and non-profit sectors 
provide different services (Coston 1998; Najam 2000). Salamon (1987) refers to this as non-
profit federalism; that is, where the non-profit service delivery advantage is combined with 
the government’s advantages in generating resources and setting priorities. The sharing of 
information builds on social learning theory, which means that the government holds 
professional expertise and the non-profit group holds localised or social expertise (Thomas 
1985). Complementarity is always built on some level of mutual respect between government 
and NPOs, which arises from shared information and mutual understanding (Coston 1998). 
Complementarity is similar to ‘brokerage’ in Lyons (1995).  
 
Collaboration is where government shares responsibility and action with non-profit agencies, 
allowing non-profit agencies to participate in planning and policy making (Coston 1998).  
Collaboration is difficult to attain, particularly when there are competing priorities, interests 
and values. Indeed, it requires strong levels of mutual understanding (Coston 1998).  
Unfortunately, these arrangements are rare (Brown and Troutt 2004), often as a result of the 
discrepancies in power and money between the two sectors. Austin (2003) has specifically 
argued that research into successful collaborations is critically important.  
  
The typology of relationships elaborated by Coston (1998) is very useful as it implies a 
continuum of relationships and can thus assist in identifying current situations and positing 
ways of progressing relationships along the continuum. It includes most of the other 
definitions advanced by other authors.  
 
Research methodology  
 
This research comprises two case studies of successful government / non-profit funding 
relationships. A total of ninety-four organisations participated, representing a cross-section of 
the NPOs in Queensland, Australia. 
 
There are many peak agencies in Australia, each representing a different aspect of the Third 
Sector.  The present research includes primary data collected by means of semi-structured 
interviews with peak agencies; focus groups with service providers; and semi-structured 
interviews with service providers and government staff involved in the administration of the 
programs. These interviews followed a process of making initial contact with key informants, 
and then using snowball sampling for the purpose of identifying additional interviewees.  
Secondary data were obtained through source documentation from government and the peak 
agencies participating in funding programs. Triangulation was achieved by comparing the 
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perspectives of peak agencies, service delivery organisations and government departments, as 
well as case study data relating to two different funding programs, and secondary 
documentation.  
 
A total of twenty-four peak agencies were interviewed.  These interviews were used to 
identify features of government funding programs that appear to work well from the 
perspective of the non-profit sector. Peak agencies identified government funding programs 
that they believed were well regarded by the non-profit area they represented. They were then 
asked to nominate one small and one large NPO in receipt of funding from government 
agencies that were known to deliver effective services. Information from interviews with the 
agencies was collated. 
  
CEOs (or their delegates) from each of the peak agencies were contacted in order to identify 
line managers in NPOs who had experience in conducting programs and could contribute 
meaningfully to a focus group. This process is an example of snowball sampling, because the 
end nominees were not selected as part of the original sample. While not truly ‘random’, the 
nominees who participated in the focus groups were also not selected by the research team. 
 
Three focus groups were conducted, with a total of sixty-eight participant organisations.  
These organisations were deemed to be representative of most of the different elements of the 
NPO sector in Queensland, such as arts, community services, housing, health, sport, and 
youth. Each focus group was asked to identify government funding programs that they felt 
could fall under the category labelled ‘highly regarded’ by the peak groups. Several funding 
programs were nominated, with two programs selected for further study.  
 
These two programs became case studies that were used to identify the elements of successful 
relationships.  Cases studies are important theory building methodologies (Eisenhardt 1989), 
as they ground empirical data into real situations, and enable examination of the phenomena 
in question (Stake 2005). The use of cases to develop typologies is an important first step in 
theory development (Doty and Glick 1994; Reynolds 1971) particularly as cases assist 
researchers to determine the variables which reflect the phenomena (Bacharach 1989). To 
collect data for the two cases, interviews were held with line managers and people involved 
in direct service delivery under these programs; and with government employees responsible 
for the administration of the funding program. The results of these interviews were 
triangulated with secondary data where appropriate.  
 
Thematic analysis was undertaken of the interviews and focus groups, which followed a 
reiterative process. Coding of themes and groups was undertaken, followed by a comparative 
analysis in order to identify similarities and contrasts between the different focus groups and 
the specific case studies. Major themes were then clarified and reported.  
 
The analysis also allowed for theoretical triangulation (Jick 1979), where the different 
typologies are used comparatively to analyse the findings, and advance a new typology.  
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Findings 
Elements of a successful program: interviews with peak group representatives 
 
A series of consistent themes emerged from the interviews (n=24) with peak agencies. First, 
competitive funding was portrayed as consistently problematic in developing positive 
relationships between government and the non-profit sector.  Many agencies believed that 
competitive tendering results in instability or uncertainty for NPOs. Furthermore, it is 
believed to undermine attempts at cooperation between government and NPOs.  Conversely, 
consultation, credibility and collaboration were three common elements considered desirable 
by the non-profit sector. 
 
A second theme to emerge, related to contracts and service agreements. In general, peak 
agencies believe that there needs to be flexibility in the funding arrangements. According to 
these agencies, programs that worked well were flexible with respect to meeting outcomes 
and accountability processes. 
 
A third theme, related to objectives and performance measures. Representatives of peak 
agencies generally held that there should be agreement between the non-profits and 
government agencies funding them with regard to objectives and the evaluation process.  An 
associated feature of effective programs is that government agencies do not micro-manage 
service delivery organisations; rather, the program is flexible about the way in which 
outcomes are achieved.  Furthermore, representatives of peak agencies reported that 
qualitative as well as quantitative measures of success are necessary when evaluating funding 
programs.  They perceived that government agencies wanted outcomes that could be 
quantified, whilst community organisations were more interested in qualitative measures.  
Thus, interviewees indicated that a successful program would require a convergence of 
understandings with respect to outcomes, and how those outcomes should be measured.  
 
A fourth theme to emerge, related to reporting requirements. Representatives of peak 
agencies felt that governments often seek quite complex information from organisations that 
do not have the capacity or time to gather it.  They believed that onerous reporting 
requirements resulted in distrust between community organisations and government.  
Interviewees representing peak agencies suggested that an optimal funding model emphasises 
partnership rather than the purchase of a service, with the assumption that such a purchase is 
a contractual arrangement and thus linked with tedious reporting requirements. 
 
A fifth theme to emerge related to the working relationship between government and non-
profit organisations. According to representatives of peak agencies, good programs 
incorporate processes for consultation between governments and NPOs. The groups also 
argued that governments often do not understand the sector that is being funded.  
Accordingly, governments need to invest the time to understand the organisations that they 
are funding before jointly developing evaluation processes and reporting requirements.  
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In summary, the successful programs contained the following elements according to 
interviews with representatives of peak non-profit organisations: 
  
 The funding programs had clear goals; 
 Trust was embedded in the process of negotiating the grant; 
 NPOs were permitted to manage service delivery; 
 Partnership processes were included in grant negotiation; 
 Program funding included capital works or seed funding;  
 Feedback was provided in cases where applications were not successful; 
 Comprehensive information was available relating to the program, its aims and what 
is funded; 
 Application periods were predictable and regular; 
 Community capacity building was included in the funding; 
 A collaborative relationship was fostered; and 
 Programs were flexible with regard to how outcomes were achieved and how funds 
were managed.  
Elements of a successful program: focus groups with non-profit service providers 
 
Data were collected from three focus groups (n=68) of service providers, two in Brisbane and 
one in regional Queensland. Focus groups were also concerned with the issues of 
competitiveness, contracts and service agreements, reporting and accountability, and 
relationships with government. The data collected from these focus groups were similar to 
those reported in interviews with peak agencies. In summary, focus groups identified the 
following as features of programs that were deemed successful: 
 Adequate funding is provided to cover core operating costs as well as service delivery 
costs; 
 There is timely advance notice of applications being called, a sufficient amount of 
time between tender and lodgement dates, and adequate time between receipt of funds 
and approval of tender to implement services; 
 There is sufficient time to achieve outcomes and realise stability in the organisation 
(that is, short-term funding makes life difficult for the non-profit organisation); and 
 Programs reward rather than penalise efficiency. 
 
As with the peak agencies, the focus group participants identified several funding programs 
that were regarded as successful. Two of these programs were selected for detailed case 
studies. The basis of this selection was that they were considered successful, involved 
recurrent operational funding for service delivery, and were open to new entrants. Funding 
agencies also confirmed that these programs were well regarded within government. 
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Elements of a successful program: Case study 1 
 
The first funding program identified for further research was the ‘Moving Ahead – Post 
School Services – Adult Lifestyle Support Program’. This program provides a transition from 
school to adulthood for people with a disability. Representatives of two service delivery 
agencies in receipt of funding from the program were interviewed. A government officer 
responsible for implementing the funding program in the Brisbane region was also 
interviewed. Some of the key findings were: 
 
The overall process is driven by trying to determine client goals, and maximise the 
hours for clients (Service Provider 1). The actual services provided are negotiated 
with clients (Service Provider 1), and the individuals with a disability have control 
over the funding (Service Provider 2). The goals and services provided through the 
program are agreed upon by the government agency, the families and the service 
agencies (Government Officer 1).  
 
These interviews indicated that the following factors were important influences on the 
success of this program: 
 
 Tendering is collaborative and consultative; 
 Funding is adequate, flexible and rewards performance; 
 Tenders allow reasonable timelines for application and delivery of outcomes; 
 Tenders are called regularly and advertised well; 
 Decisions are fair, follow due process, and are based on clear criteria; 
 Contracts and service agreements have mutually negotiated outcomes; 
 Reporting is simple, uses qualitative and quantitative data, is outcome focused and 
involves single line reporting of budgets; and 
 Relationships are based on trust, mutual respect and understandings, shared values, 
and involve a capacity building approach. 
 
Case study 2 
 
The second program nominated for study by the focus groups was the State Development 
Program, funded by Sport and Recreation Queensland.  Through this program, major sporting 
organisations are able to gain funding that can be used to promote their sport across 
Queensland.  The program is twelve years old and, according to service providers, is the best 
funded in the Commonwealth.  Funding is based on the strategic plan of the organisation. 
What is more, the government agency has been very responsive to the sector’s needs: 
 
Government uses the strategic plan of the organisation as the justification for funding 
need (Service Provider 3). This strategic plan was developed for the good of the 
organisation itself, and some organisations were provided with additional support to 
develop a plan (Government Officers 2 & 3).  
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All elements of Case Study 1 were named, with one addition. Service providers believed that 
peak bodies have good working relationships with the Minister for Sport, which means that 
joint initiatives are undertaken between the government and the peak body. The government 
engages with peak bodies as advocates for the sector and works with peak bodies in order to 
deliver training programs to the sector. The peak body has been given its own program for 
funding. 
 
Analysis and implications for government / non-profit relations  
 
This research identified funding programs that were viewed positively by both NPOs and 
government. The elements of a successful funding program that were identified by means of 
the interviews, focus groups and case studies may assist government and non-profit groups in 
improving their funding relationships. These results also further our knowledge of models of 
government / non-profit relations, and follow a call to test the empirical factors affecting 
relationships between government and non-profit organisations (McLoughlin 2011). 
 
A New Typology of Funding Relationships  
 
Previous models reviewed in this work (that is, Brown and Ryan 2003; Coston 1998; Lyons 
1995; Najam 2000) provide a starting point for identifying government / non-profit 
relationships. Lyons (1995) focuses on the actual funding mechanisms rather than 
government / non-profit relationships. The two programs reviewed in this report had different 
funding arrangements, with the disabilities program approximating the voucher funding 
model (Lyons 1995; see Figure 1), and the sport and recreation program approximating a 
contractual model (Coston 1998; see Figure 1). However, the funding arrangements alone do 
not explain why these programs were so well regarded, for other programs had similar 
arrangements. What made the two programs successful for both government and non-profit 
organisations was, it seems clear, the resultant relationship. This analysis implies the need for 
a government / non-profit relations model that extends beyond the nature of the way that non-
profit organisations are generally funded. As McLoughlin (2010) notes, the factors that affect 
the relationships – particularly autonomy and balance of power – are crucial to assess 
empirically. 
 
Critique of the Various Typologies  
 
Coston’s model (1998) is comprehensive in its approach and allows for a broader set of 
relationships than does that proposed by either Lyons (1995) or Brown and Ryan (2003). It 
also provides a lineal logic to the sets of relationships that is not evident in the other models.  
As with Najam (2000), Coston’s model (1998) does not allow for the possibility of 
philanthropic government funding (i.e. grants), a view which has also been identified by more 
recent authors (Almog-Bar and Zychlinski 2012). More importantly, Coston’s model has 
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been developed from the perspective of government’s openness or resistance to pluralism, 
which fails to acknowledge the role of NPOs in determining the nature of the relationship 
(Najam 2000), specifically that NPOs can exercise agency in order to create room to 
manoeuvre (McLoughlin 2011). Brown and Ryan (2003) provide a broad categorisation of 
government / non-profit relationships, but do not show the full possible set of relationships 
between government and non-profit groups as outlined in Coston’s model (1998).  
 
Thus while each of the typologies has relative strengths, none cover all of the aspects of non-
profit / government relationships which exist currently, or adequately operationalise 
underlying dimensions.  
 
Figure 2 contains the components of a new model of government / non-profit relations. 
McLoughlin (2010) specifically noted that balance of power and the relative autonomy of 
non-profits needs to be systematically considered. As can be seen, this new model builds on 
others reviewed in this paper, and incorporates the empirical data reported here. The model 
identifies six types of relationships: namely, contempt, conflict, charity, contracting, 
cooperation and concordance. The model may prove useful for the purpose of analysing the 
current condition of relationships between non-profit agencies and governments. 
 
 
Figure 2: A new model of government / non-profit relationships 
 
Contempt 
Coston (1998) noted that it is possible that government / non-profit relationships could be 
signified by repression, through either legislative or paramilitary means. While this is not 
currently evident in Queensland, a model of government / non-profit relationships needs to 
include this theoretical possibility in order to have validity since this type of relationship 
exists in other jurisdictions. In a relationship characterised by contempt, government uses its 
power to mitigate the influence of non-profit groups, sometimes by force. There is strong 
power differentiation and lack of alignment of objectives, with values in opposition to each 
other. Government / non-profit relations are often characterised by mutual contempt and lack 
of trust, which is obviously a destructive and non-productive situation. 
 
Conflict 
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In relationships characterised by conflict, funding is viewed as a means of control by 
government and is linked to attempts to diminish the voice and representation of non-profit 
groups. Gazley and Brudny (2007) found an undercurrent of negativity from non-profits 
towards government, and that some NPOs, created to oppose government policy used 
confrontation to attempt to influence government (Ramanath and Ebrahim 2010). Najam 
(1996b) notes that in many cases non-profits emerge in reaction against government policy. 
Advocacy was found to be used by various non-profit agencies in this study in an attempt to 
influence policy by stating public opposition to views of government. For its part, 
government tends to view advocacy as inappropriate for non-profit groups since the 
government funds many. This relationship, while not as destructive as contempt, is 
characterised by strong differences in values, power and objectives between the two sectors.  
The critical issue here is the right of non-profit groups to undertake advocacy and engage in 
political activism.  The government uses its power, including funding contracts, in attempts to 
silence dissent.  
 
Charity 
As noted by Lyons (1995) and Brown and Ryan (2003), there is an historic precedent in 
Australia by which governments have acted philanthropically towards non-profit groups.  The 
relationship is marked by benign benevolence, in which funding is not linked to attempts to 
control or to move into more formally structured relational arrangements. Government 
funding is given to non-profit groups with little attempt to influence or monitor the delivery 
of services since high trust exists in the relationship.  Under this form of relationships, 
government and non-profit groups have separate areas of responsibility and do not attempt to 
influence each other.  This model of funding is characterised by government’s abdicating 
responsibility for the delivery of services (ACOSS 2001), and non-profit organisations 
delivering services in accordance with their own values and ideology. Such models still exist 
in some countries (Almog-Bar and Zychlinkski 2012; Person et al. 2009). However, 
accountability for public funds is becoming increasingly critical for governments worldwide, 
and may prevent these forms of partnership (Person et al. 2009) since government must 
account to parliament and ultimately the public for money spent, even by agencies acting on 
their behalf. Nevertheless, for a complete model, such a funding relationship needs to be 
noted. 
 
Contracting 
A contracting relationship is primarily one of a purchaser and a provider of services. The 
relationship is moved to a formal contractual arrangement in order to control risk and to 
ensure that NPOs become accountable for the use of government moneys (Feiock and 
Andrew 2006). Contracting applies market logic to the relationships between government and 
NPOs (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011). The major shift that occurs as a result of this 
relationship is that government and non-profits contract to work together, whilst tolerating 
different values and objectives (Adams and Hess 2001). Program objectives are usually set by 
government, which indicates strong power differentiation, sometimes to the extent that the 
NPOs behave as an agent of government (Van Slyke 2007).  The arrangement implies that 
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while the values and objectives of government and non-profit organisations may not be 
closely aligned, there is a functional agreement to work together.  
 
Cooperation 
This relationship type is characterised by higher levels of cooperation and collaboration than 
is implied by a contractual type (Batley and Rose 2010). As noted in the literature review, 
collaboration is often merely a façade (Almog-Bar and Zychlinski 2012). While Brinkerhoff 
(2002) proposed that partnership be used as an ideal type against which all other relationships 
are measured (Brinkerhoff 2002), sometimes, as Entwistle et al. (2007) found, NPOs were 
critical of their ‘partnerships’ with government. True collaboration was distorted due to the 
power differentials driven by hierarchical and market logics underpinning the contractual 
relationship.  As other authors put it, there is a long hierarchical shadow cast over the 
relationship (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; Kettl 2000; Schillemans 2008), no matter how 
good it might be. True examples of cooperation are rare (Brown and Troutt 2004), as 
Brinkerhoff (2002) notes, partnership, as an ideal or normative type of relationship between 
government and non-profits does not make sense in every situation. In fact, partnership 
appears quite alien to researchers and practitioners in some situations. However, the disability 
case study identified earlier in this paper is one of the rare examples of this type of 
relationship.  This particular case study was characterised by a willingness to work together.  
The important features of this relationship type are the stronger level of agreed core values 
and objectives, and negotiation of outcomes with clients and NPOs.  While not a grant, 
funding is more flexible than a normal contract.  There is a smaller differentiation in power, 
and government allows NPOs levels of discretion in service delivery on account of increased 
trust in the relationship. 
  
Concordance 
This level of relationship was evident between the Queensland Department of Tourism, Sport 
and Racing and state-wide sporting groups and their agencies. The level of relationship here 
is significantly more than cooperation, which still has levels of differentiation in terms of 
power.  Here, mutual respect was evident and exceptional.  The government agency made the 
objectives of the funding the same as the strategic plan of the agency being funded.  There 
was an absence of government micromanagement of agencies and of controls. Rather, 
government attempted to build the capability of the NPOs to deliver services. This level of 
relationship does not find a correlate in the existing typologies identified in the literature 
review, given the extremely high level of shared values and low power differentiation.  
Critique and testing of the model 
The case studies identified earlier in the paper can be used as a starting point for testing this 
model.  Case study 1 is an example of strong cooperation in the new typology of relationships 
outlined here. While shared values and objectives for the clients are evident, the objectives of 
government funding programs and non-profit organisations are not completely aligned, and 
there is also some power differentiation, with government being reluctant to disclose 
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decision-making criteria for funding to NPOs.  However, it is certainly close to concordance 
and includes all the aspects considered important in the second case study.  
 
Case study 2 is an example of concordance in the new typology presented in this paper.  
Goals and values of government and non-profit agencies are virtually the same, power 
differentiation is very low, funding levels are high, and reporting requirements are low.  
Concordance is evident not only in the shared values and objectives, but also in the funding 
process itself.  The funding criteria were clearly communicated to NPOs and government 
assisted in developing funding applications. These government agencies involved 
representatives from the non-profit sporting sector in decision-making processes. Regular 
sharing of information, consultation processes on funding and proactive and constructive 
engagement by the peak agency with government were all evident from the interviews.  
 
These case studies demonstrate that government values can be aligned with those of non-
profit groups, and that the objectives of government and non-profit groups can be very 
similar. As noted in the introduction, this situation is quite uncommon in Australia. In other 
contexts, such as continental Europe, NPOs may have a far greater incidence of such 
arrangements (Brinkerhoff 2002; Thomson et al. 2007). Essentially, each country has a 
different historical trajectory for the relationships between government and the third sector 
(Bode 2006).   
 
In such circumstances of close engagement with government, through knowledge sharing, 
agreed values, negotiating outcomes and common goals, advocacy may not be as important.  
In order for this situation to be achieved, government and non-profit groups would need to 
expend considerable effort in developing strong channels for the constructive sharing of 
information, values and ideas, and intentionally move to alternative modes of relationship, in 
preference to conflict.  
 
 
 
Future Research  
 
Non-profit / government relationships are of course multi-dimensional, and many models 
which depict these relationships across one-dimensional (Coston 1998) or bi-dimensional 
(Brinkerhoff 2002; Najam 2000) frameworks. While this has considerable utility and 
conceptual simplicity, categorisation based on a single continuum may be quite forced on 
occasion, and insufficient to capture the nuances involved in such relationships. This is 
particularly true as the relationship between government and non-profits are somewhat 
’schizophrenic’ (Bode 2012, 137). For example, governments typically regulate and contract 
(procure) services from the third sector, while NPO typically advocate changes to 
government policy, and also contract to provide services. It is possible for relationships to be 
good and bad at the same time, depending on which roles are being discussed. Single or dual 
dimensional models simply cannot capture this complexity.  
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One way of addressing this shortcoming in previous models would be to eschew single 
dimensional models and instead assess relationships between NPO and government on the 
basis of multidimensional models. While it is not possible to outline in full what such a 
model might look like, it is possible to identify a couple of the core constructs, which are 
already explicit in the existing models. The following is not an exhaustive list, but are 
certainly constructs present in the extant models: 
 
 Power asymmetry as a construct concerns the extent to which government acts in a 
coercive, harassing or punitive manner towards the non-profit sector in a policy and 
regulatory sense (Coston 1998; Brown and Ryan 2003), which Coston (1998) notes 
can happen with both elected and dictatorial forms of government. This construct 
could be operationalised from high (5), to a low (1) on a likert scale.  
 The attachment of conditions to funding in contracts by government, is an overt 
attempt to exert specific legal control on the behaviour of non-profits via the 
provision of finances by government (Lyons 1995; Brown and Ryan 2003), and is the 
source of much discontent from the non-profit sector (McGegor-Lowndes 2008). 
Such a construct could be measured in a range from few too many conditions.  
 Goal and value alignment, which is concerned with the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ specific 
programs and activities are undertaken is another important element of funding 
relationships (Najam 2000; Brinkerhoff 2000; Young 2000) and could be measured 
from strong to weak.  
 Shared planning and decision making differentiates government determining the 
needs of a community in isolation, compared to a situation where the needs of a 
community are decided in a collaborative manner between government and the third 
sector representatives (Coston 1998; Young 2000; Brown and Ryan 2003). Such a 
construct could be determined from high to low.  
 Finally, accountability in the NPO context is best defined as a ‘social mechanism 
whereby an agent or organisation can be held to account by another agent or 
institution’ (Bovens 2010, 948), involves the extent to which non-profits have to 
provide an account to government for what was done (Brinkerhoff 2002; Brown and 
Ryan 2003). Again this could be measured from high to low on a likert scale.  
 
Taken together, each of these constructs forms a multidimensional view of NPO / 
government relationships which may be plotted on radar graphs or similar. For example, 
Figure 3 represents the two cases examined in this paper, compared to the ‘business as usual’ 
under NPM:  
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Figure 3: Comparative analysis of NPO / Government relationships on 
multidimensional scales 
 
While arguably an improvement on one dimensional models, the final form of this model will 
depend on the constructs which are chosen for its composition, and the list above should not 
be seen as exhaustive. For example ‘Freedom to conduct advocacy’ is an important role for 
NPOs as they seek to influence government policy (Coston 1998; Lyons 1995; Brown and 
Ryan 2003). Government sometimes seeks to constrain this activity in contractual 
relationships much to the discontent of NPOs (McGregor-Lowndes 2008). 
 
Obviously, the model outlined in Figure 3 is very underdeveloped, and needs to be 
elaborated, refined, tested further in multiple contexts in order to make sure that the 
dimensions are sufficient to describe the relationship phenomena, and that the measures are 
appropriate. Specifically the following steps would be needed to fully develop this model: 
1. A rigorous definition and validation of the underlying constructs in the model needs 
to be undertaken. Suitable methods for this would be a meta-analysis of the extant 
literature on government / non-profit relationships, to identify the central constructs.  
2. Operationalisation of questions to measure the constructs which have been identified 
would be undertaken, with reference to extant research.   
3. This meta analysis could then be critiqued through a panel of experts to validate and 
finalise the constructs, their definition, and the proposed methods of measurement.  
4. Field testing of the measurement and resulting models could then be undertaken, and 
final refinement to the instrument undertaken. 
5. Full scale implementation of the instrument could be undertaken on a suitable sample.  
 
As a word of caution, the model would be a representation of government non-profit 
relationships, and may be best served to assess a particular form of relationship, perhaps with 
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government as contractee and NPO as contractor.Given the multiplicity of constructs and 
funding which can be undertaken between government and NPO, the model could either be 
used to assess each individual relationship, or to provide an overall summary of the 
relationship between government and NPO.  
 
While in need of further testing and refining, the model above does serve to progress our 
thinking about NPO / government relationships, enables discussion to move away from 
classification regimes, and focus instead on the underlying factors which affect such 
relationships. Such a shift also provides a mechanism for understanding multiple 
relationships which exist at the same time, or tracking changes in a relationship over time. As 
Bode (2012, 137) notes, sometimes the competing logics of competition and collaboration 
result in ‘schizophrenic experience of being invited to both participate more strongly in 
collaborative processes and compete more fiercely’. Traditional classification models would 
find schizoid approaches to relationships difficult. However, models which seek to measure 
the underlying dimensions of such relationships face far less difficulty.   
 
The actual decision making concerning how to determine ‘high and low’ ends of a continuum 
may be difficult due to the degree of discretion and comparative analysis involved. However, 
the methodological process set out should ameliorate most of these difficulties. Even if this is 
not the case, discussions and academic debates about such measurement is likely to be more 
fruitful than discussions about categorical definitions, such as partnership, which are often 
context dependent and in the end, will rely on the operationalisation process begun here.  
 
In terms of the Australian context, there has been a raft of new initiatives in recent years, in 
particular the introduction of a National Charity regulator, the Australian Charities and Non-
profits Commission [ACNC] based on the UK Charity Commission (Australian Charities and 
Non-profits Commission 2013). In addition to any coercive isomorphic trends, (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983) the increased professionalization of the non-profit sector across the world 
may also have a positive impact on the mutual understanding between government and non-
profit organisations. Understanding such changes will require specific research designs which 
are able to tease out the nuances of different isomorphic trends in how NPOs and government 
organisations relate to each other.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper adds to the literature on models of engagement between government and non-
profit organisations. In response to calls for empirically validated factors which affect 
funding relationships (McLoughlin 2011), a new typology is advanced, that can be 
operationalised against the variables of values, objectives and power. In addition, two case 
studies in which cooperation and concordance were achieved have been identified, adding a 
category of relationships to the existing set identified by previous authors, derived from the 
somewhat unusual Australian context. This fits into the broader research agenda outlined by 
Osborne (2006) in terms of the examination of a more relational approach to contracting 
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between government and NPOs. Since the goal of the research, was to explore specifically 
the reasons for the success of a particular form of government funding, the findings presented 
in this paper challenge existing theoretical bases. Additionally, a further extension of the 
analysis suggest that instead of categorising funding relationship as different types; a more 
fruitful endeavour might be to examine the underlying dimensions of such relationships, such 
as power asymmetry and goal and value alignment. While such a model requires further 
testing and clarification in multiple contexts, it does seek to initiate a discussion based on the 
multi-dimensional nature of NPO / government relationships is likely to be more useful than 
the historic approaches to simple discrete categories, and one which can handle the 
simultaneity (Young 2000) or schizoid (Bode 2012) nature of such relationships.  
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